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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
could be left entirely to the Board's discretion. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota sums up the matter thus: "Reciprocity and comity import the
granting of a favor, which conception of itself would seem to negative the
right to complain of its denial, except where such right is clearly given."'0
Then, too, administrative discretion would have considerable free play as
to schools within the state, it having been determined in Missouri that quo
warranto would lie against a medical school not recognized by the Board,
7
and in Ohio that the Board was the proper agency to determine in the first
instance if a medical college was not reputable, and hence carrying on its
activities contrary to its charter.8 In this manner, a state could leave con-
siderable power to administrative discretion, prevent unqualified persons
moving from state to state without sufficient examination, and relieve the
courts of passing on the technical questions raised in determining the suffi-
ciency of a medical course. W. H. lM. '36.
TAXATION-BANK DEPosrrs-DuE P0CEsss.-Appellant company was or-
ganized in Delaware. It maintained there, through the Corporation Service
Co., a duplicate set of books in fulfillment of the laws of that state. The
company's plants were located in Ohio, and its principal business offices
were in Wheeling, West Virginia, from which office all contracts were ap-
proved, checks received and deposited, and in which the Directors' meetings
-were held. West Virginia imposed an ad valorem property tax on bank
deposits in the state. In an action brought to recover the tax paid under
protest it was held, that the tax did not violate the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Wheeling Steel Co. V. Fox.1
It is well settled that a state may not tax any property not within its
jurisdiction without violating the due process clause.2 The rule is estab-
lished that a state may tax tangibles permanently located within its boun-
daries.3 The courts have applied the maxim nobilia sequuntur personam
in determining the situs of intangibles for the purpose of taxation.4 The
courts have felt that this maxim affords protection against multiplied tax-
ation.5 This fact was strikingly illustrated in the case of Burnett v.
Brooks.6 There the decedent, a subject of great Britain and a resident of
Cuba, left stocks and bonds in a New York bank. The court held that for
the purpose of taxation the United States had jurisdiction and applied the
maxim as between the states thereby avoiding the hardship of possible
double taxation.
6 Wililams v. Minnesota State Board of Medical Examiners (1913) 120
Minn. 313, 139 N. W. 500.
7 State v. St. Louis College of Physicians and Surgeons (Mo. 1927) 295
S. W. 537.
8 State v. Hygeia Medical College (1899) 60 Ohio St. 122, 54 N. E. 86.
1 (May 18, 1936) 3 U. S. Law Week 959; 56 S. Ct. 773.
2Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota (1930) 280 U. S. 204.
3 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky (1905) 199 U. S. 194.
4 Blodgett v. Silberman (1928) 277 U. S. 1.5 Supra, note 2.
6 (1933) 288 U. S. 378.
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Choses in action, employed in business transactions within a state, acquire
a taxable situs in that state.7 The rational seems to be that it is property
used within the state for the purpose of obtaining profit from its use and,
therefore, it is of that kind of property that should contribute to the sup-
port of the protecting state. The maxim, mobilia, sequuntur personam was
said to be at most a legal fiction "its proper operation being to prevent a
mischief, or remedy an inconvenience that might result from the general
rule of law."8
The application of the "business situs" doctrine to circumstances as those
which existed in the instant case seems justifiable. The centralization of
business management in a state clearly takes the ease out of the operation
of the maxim since no element of hardship is present. N. C. '37.
TAXATION-STOCK DIvEND AS INCOME.-The petitioner in 1924 and 1926
purchased preferred stock in a corporation whose articles of incorporation
provided that holders of preferred stock should receive annual dividends of
seven dollars a share in cash or, at the option of the corporation, one share
of common stock for each share of preferred. The preferred stock was re-
deemable at $105 per share plus accrued dividends; and upon dissolution or
liquidation was entitled to preferential payment of $100 a share plus ac-
crued dividend and no more: The common stock was entitled in such event
to the assets of the company remaining after payment of the preferred.
The company for the period of 1925 to 1928 inclusive, elected to pay the
preferred dividends in common stock. The point at issue was whether under
the Revenue Act of 1926 and 1928 one who purchases cumulative, non-vot-
ing, preferred shares of a corporation upon which a dividend is subse-
quently paid in common shares must, upon a sale or other disposition of
the preferred shares, apportion their cost between the preferred and com-
mon for the purpose of determining gain or loss. In computing the profit
realized by the petitioner the Commissioner allocated to the common stock
so received, in each instance, a proportionate amount of the cost of the pre-
ferred thereby decreasing the resulting cost basis per share and increasing
the income. On appeal: Held, that the dividends were not stock dividends
within the terms of the statute. Koshland v. Helvering, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.,
This decision is clearly in line with the previous cases of Eiser v. Ma-
comber,2 and Peabody v. Esner.3 The effect of all the cases is that a stock
dividend distributed to classes of shareholders who have pre-emptive rights
to the stock issue in which the "dividend" is paid is not taxable. Eisner v.
Macomber decided that such a dividend is not income within the meaning of
the Sixteenth Amendment. The instant case decided that only such stock
7 New Orleans v. Stempel (1899) 175 U. S. 309.
8 Ibid, at p. 314 of 175 U. S.
1 (May 18, 1936), 3 U. S. Law Week 942; Revenue Act of 1928, sec. 115 (f),
c. 852, 45 Stat. 791, 822; Revenue Act of 1926, sec. 201 (f), c. 27, 44 Stat.
9, 11: A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax."
2 (1919), 252 U. S. 189.
& (1917), 247 U. S. 347.
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